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ABSTRACT
Peer-to-peer protocols play an increasingly instrumental role
in Internet content distribution. Consequently, it is important
to gain a full understanding of how these protocols behave
in practice and how their parameters impact overall perfor-
mance. We present the first experimental investigation of the
peer selection strategy of the popular BitTorrent protocol in
an instrumented private torrent. By observing the decisions
of more than 40 nodes, we validate three BitTorrent prop-
erties that, though widely believed to hold, have not been
demonstrated experimentally. These include the clustering
of similar-bandwidth peers, the effectiveness of BitTorrent’s
sharing incentives, and the peers’ high average upload uti-
lization. In addition, our results show that BitTorrent’s new
choking algorithm in seed state provides uniform service to
all peers, and that an underprovisioned initial seed leads to
the absence of peer clustering and less effective sharing in-
centives. Based on our observations, we provide guidelines
for seed provisioning by content providers, and discuss a
tracker protocol extension that addresses an identified lim-
itation of the protocol.
1 INTRODUCTION
In just a few years, peer-to-peer (P2P) content distribution
has managed to enter the class of applications generating a
significant amount of Internet traffic [14]. This widespread
adoption of P2P protocols for delivering large data vol-
umes to geographically dispersed peers is arguably due to
their scalability and robustness properties. Understanding
the mechanisms that affect the performance of such proto-
cols, and designing improved algorithms to overcome exist-
ing shortcomings, is critical to the continued success of P2P
data delivery. This paper presents a detailed study of BitTor-
rent, one of the most popular P2P content distribution pro-
tocols. We measure BitTorrent’s performance in a controlled
environment, running real experiments on a private testbed
for a variety of scenarios.
There have recently been several attempts to analyze Bit-
Torrent system behavior, as well as experimentally evaluate
its fundamental algorithms. Some researchers have formu-
lated analytical models for the problem of efficient data ex-
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change among peers. For example, Yang et al. [23] study
the service capacity of BitTorrent-like protocols. They show
that it increases exponentially at the beginning of the down-
load session, and scales well with the number of participating
peers. In addition, measurement studies of actual download
traces have attempted to shed more light into the success of
the protocol. For example, Pouwelse et al. [19] study the file
popularity, file availability, and content lifetime of numerous
download sessions.
However, certain properties of previous studies prevented
them from accurately evaluating the dynamics of BitTor-
rent algorithms and their impact on the overall performance.
The analytical models provide valuable insight, but typically
make unrealistic assumptions to simplify analysis, such as
giving all participants global system knowledge [20,23]; ac-
tual download traces can differ substantially from their pre-
dictions [11, 19]. Previous measurement studies have evalu-
ated peers connected to public torrents [11, 12, 19]. These
studies provide useful information about the behavior of
deployed BitTorrent systems, but the information available
from a public torrent is coarse-grained, and does not explain
individual peer decisions during the download. A more re-
cent study does evaluate those decisions, but only from the
viewpoint of a single peer [15].
In order to overcome these limitations, we evaluate the
performance of BitTorrent by running extensive experiments
in a controlled environment. In particular, we focus on the
so-called choking algorithm for peer selection, which is ar-
guably the driving factor behind the protocol’s high perfor-
mance [8]. This approach allows us to examine the behav-
ior of BitTorrent systems under a microscope, and evaluate
the impact of different parameters on system performance.
In the process, we validate certain properties of the choking
algorithm that are widely believed to hold, but have not been
demonstrated experimentally. In addition, we identify new
properties and offer insights into the behavior of the choking
algorithm in different scenarios, as well as into the impact of
proper provisioning of the initial seed on performance.
The contributions of this work are three-fold. First, we
demonstrate that the choking algorithm enables good clus-
tering of similar-bandwidth peers, ensures effective shar-
ing incentives by rewarding peers who contribute with high
download rates, and achieves high upload utilization for the
majority of the download duration. These properties have
been hinted at in previous work; this study constitutes their
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first experimental validation. Second, we pinpoint newly ob-
served properties and limitations of the choking algorithm.
The new choking algorithm in seed state provides service
to all peers uniformly. As a result, if the seed is underprovi-
sioned, clustering is poor and peers tend to finish their down-
loads at the same time, independently of how much they con-
tribute. Finally, based on our observations, we provide guide-
lines for seed provisioning by content providers, and discuss
a tracker protocol extension that addresses an identified lim-
itation of the protocol, namely the low upload utilization at
the beginning of a torrent’s lifetime.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a brief description of the BitTorrent protocol and
an explanation of the choking algorithm, as implemented in
the official BitTorrent client. Section 3 describes our method-
ology and the rationale behind our experiments, while Sec-
tion 4 presents our experimental results. Section 5 discusses
our proposed seed provisioning guidelines, and the proposed
tracker protocol extension. Lastly, Section 6 sets this study
in the context of related work, and Section 7 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer content distribution protocol that
has been shown to scale with the number of participating
peers. In particular, a BitTorrent system capitalizes on the
upload capacity of each peer in order to increase the global
system capacity as the number of peers increases. A ma-
jor factor behind BitTorrent’s success is its built-in incentive
mechanism, as enforced by the choking algorithm, which is
intended to motivate peers to contribute data. The rest of this
section introduces the terminology used in this paper, de-
scribes BitTorrent’s operation in detail, and focuses on the
choking algorithm in particular.
2.1 Terminology
The terminology used in the BitTorrent community is not
standardized. For the sake of clarity, we define here the terms
used throughout this paper.
• Pieces and Blocks Content transferred using BitTorrent
is split into pieces, and each piece is split into multiple
blocks. Blocks are the transmission unit in the network,
but peers can only share complete pieces with others.
• Interested and Choked We say that peer A is interested
in peer B, when B has pieces that A does not have. Con-
versely, peer A is not interested in peer B, when B only
has a subset of the pieces of A. We also say that peer
A is being choked by peer B, when B has decided not
to send any data to A. Conversely, peer A is being un-
choked by peer B, when B is willing to send data to A.
Note that this does not necessarily mean that peer B is
uploading data to peer A. It just means that B is willing
to upload to A, whenever A makes a piece request to B.
• Peer Set Each peer maintains a list of other peers, to
which it has open TCP connections. We call this list the
peer set. This is also known as the neighbor set.
• Local and Remote Peers When we illustrate the chok-
ing algorithm below we take the point of view of a sin-
gle peer that we call local peer. We refer to peers that
are in the local peer’s peer set as remote peers.
• Leecher and Seed A peer can be in one of two states:
the leecher state, when it is still downloading pieces of
the content, and the seed state when it has all the pieces
and is sharing them with others. In short, we say that a
peer is a leecher when it is in the leecher state, and a
seed when it is in the seed state.
• Initial Seed The initial seed is the peer that initially
offers the content for download. There can be more than
one initial seed. In this paper, we consider only the case
of a single initial seed.
• Rarest-First Algorithm The rarest-first algorithm is
the piece selection strategy used in BitTorrent, also
known as the local rarest-first algorithm, since it bases
its decisions on limited local knowledge of the torrent.
Each peer maintains a list of the number of copies of
each piece that peers in its peer set have. It uses this in-
formation to define a rarest pieces set, which contains
the indices of all the pieces with the least number of
copies. This set is updated every time a remote peer in
the peer set acquires a new piece, and is consulted for
the selection of the next piece to download.
• Choking Algorithm The choking algorithm is the peer
selection strategy used in BitTorrent, also known as the
tit-for-tat algorithm. We provide a detailed description
of this algorithm in section 2.3.
• Official BitTorrent Client The official BitTorrent
client [1], also known as mainline client, was initially
developed by Bram Cohen and is now maintained by
the company he founded.
2.2 BitTorrent Operation
A torrent is a set of peers cooperating to download the same
content using the BitTorrent protocol. Prior to distribution,
the content is divided into multiple pieces, and each piece
into multiple blocks. A metainfo file, also called a torrent
file, containing all information necessary for the download
process is created. It includes the number of pieces, SHA-1
hashes for all the pieces, and the IP address and port num-
ber of the so-called tracker. The hashes are used by peers to
verify that a piece has been received correctly. The tracker
is the only centralized component of the system. It is not in-
volved in the actual distribution of the content, but rather, it
keeps track of all peers currently participating in the down-
load and also collects statistics for all peers. In order to join a
torrent, a peer retrieves the metainfo file out of band, usually
2
from a well-known website. It then contacts the tracker that
responds with a peer set of randomly selected peers, which
might include both seeds and leechers. The newly arrived
peer starts contacting peers in this set, requesting different
pieces.
Most clients nowadays implement the rarest-first algo-
rithm for piece selection. According to that, peers select the
next piece to download from their rarest pieces set. They are
able to determine which pieces other peers have based on
a bitfield message exchanged upon new connections, which
contains the list of all pieces a peer has. Peers also send have
messages when they successfully receive and verify a new
piece. These messages are typically sent to all peers in their
peer set.
The selection that determines which peers to exchange
data with is made via the so-called choking algorithm. This
algorithm gives preference to those peers who upload data at
high rates. Once per rechoke period, typically every ten sec-
onds, each peer reconsiders the receiving data rates from all
the peers in its peer set. It then selects the fastest ones and
uploads only to those for the duration of the period. In Bit-
Torrent parlance, a peer unchokes the fastest uploaders via a
regular unchoke, and chokes all the rest. Furthermore, an ad-
ditional peer is randomly unchoked once every third rechoke
period, by means of an optimistic unchoke.
Seeds, who do not need to download any pieces, have
to follow a different strategy. Most implementations dictate
that seeds unchoke those leechers that download content at
the highest rates, in order to better utilize the available seed
upload capacity. The official BitTorrent client [1], however,
starting with version 4.0.0, has introduced an entirely new
algorithm in seed state. In this paper, we perform the first
detailed experimental evaluation of this algorithm and show
that it contributes to an even more efficient utilization of the
seed’s bandwidth.
2.3 Choking Algorithm
We now describe the choking algorithm in detail, as imple-
mented in the official client, version 4.0.2. This algorithm
was introduced to guarantee a high level of data exchange
reciprocation, and is one of the main factors behind BitTor-
rent’s sharing incentives: peers that do not contribute should
not be able to attain high download rates, since such peers
will be choked by others. As a consequence, free-riders, i.e.,
peers that never upload, should be penalized. The algorithm
does not prevent all free-riding [16, 17], but we show it per-
forms well in a variety of circumstances.
The choking algorithm is different for leechers and seeds.
In leecher state, a fixed number of remote peers are unchoked
every rechoke period. This number of parallel uploads is de-
termined by the imposed limit on upload bandwidth, unless
specified explicitly by the user. For example, for an upload
limit greater than or equal to 15 kB/s but less than 42 kB/s
this number is four. In the following, we assume that the
number of parallel uploads is set to n.
In leecher state, the choking algorithm is executed period-
ically at every rechoke period, i.e., every ten seconds and, in
addition, whenever an unchoked and interested peer leaves
the peer set, or whenever an unchoked peer switches its in-
terest state. As a consequence, the time interval between two
executions of the algorithm can be much shorter than the du-
ration of the rechoke period. Every time the choking algo-
rithm is executed, we say that a new round starts, and the
following steps are taken.
1. Interested leechers are ordered according to their ob-
served upload rates to the local peer. However, the local
peer ignores leechers that have not sent it any data in
the last 30 seconds. These snubbed peers are excluded
from consideration in order to guarantee that only con-
tributing peers are unchoked.
2. The n− 1 fastest of these leechers are unchoked via a
so-called regular unchoke.
3. In addition, a candidate peer is chosen at random to be
unchoked via a so-called optimistic unchoke.
(a) If the candidate peer is interested in the local peer,
it is indeed unchoked via an optimistic unchoke
and the round is completed.
(b) Otherwise, the candidate peer is unchoked any-
way, but the algorithm repeats step 3a with a new
randomly-chosen candidate.
The round completes when an interested peer is found
or when there are no more peers, whichever comes first.
Although more than n peers can be unchoked by the algo-
rithm, only n interested peers can be unchoked in the same
round. Unchoking uninterested peers improves reaction time
in case one of those peers becomes interested during the fol-
lowing rechoke period: data transfer can begin right away
without waiting for the choking algorithm. Optimistic un-
chokes serve two major purposes. They allow continuous
evaluation of the upload contributions of all peers in the peer
set, in an effort to discover better partners. They also enable
new peers that do not have any pieces yet to bootstrap into
the torrent by giving them some first pieces without requiring
reciprocation.
For the seed state, older versions of the official client, as
well as many current versions of other clients, performed the
same steps as in the leecher state with the only difference
that the ordering performed in step 1 was based on observed
download rates from the seed, rather than upload rates. Con-
sequently, peers with high download capacity were favored
independently of their contribution to the torrent, a fact that
could be exploited by free-riders [16]. Starting with version
4.0.0, the official client introduced an entirely new choking
algorithm in seed state. We are not aware of any other doc-
umentation of this new algorithm, nor of any other imple-
mentation that uses it. According to this algorithm, the same
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fixed number of n parallel uploads as in the leecher state is
performed during every rechoke period. However, the peer
selection criteria are now different.
The algorithm is executed periodically at every rechoke
period, i.e., every ten seconds, and, in addition, whenever an
unchoked and interested peer leaves the peer set, or whenever
an unchoked peer switches its interest state. Every time the
choking algorithm is executed, a new round starts, and the
following steps are taken.
1. The leechers that are interested and unchoked are or-
dered according to the time they were last unchoked
(most recently unchoked peers first). This step only
considers leechers that were unchoked recently (less
than 20 seconds ago) or that have pending requests for
blocks (to ensure that they get the requested data as
soon as possible). In case of a tie, leechers are ordered
according to their download rates from the seed, fastest
ones first. Note that as leechers are not expected to up-
load anything to seeds, the notion of snubbed peers does
not exist in seed state.
2. The number of optimistic unchokes to perform over
the duration of the next three rechoke periods, i.e., 30
seconds, is determined using a heuristic. These opti-
mistic unchokes are uniformly spread over this dura-
tion, performing no optimistic unchokes per rechoke pe-
riod. Due to rounding issues, no can be different for
each of the three rechoke periods. For instance, when
the number of parallel uploads is 4, the heuristic dic-
tates that only 2 optimistic unchokes must be performed
in the entire 30-second period. Thus, 1 optimistic un-
choke is performed during each of the first two rechoke
periods and none during the last.
3. The first n−no leechers in the ordered list calculated in
step 1 are unchoked via regular unchokes.
Step 1 is the key of the new algorithm in seed state. Leech-
ers are no longer unchoked based on their download rates
from the seed, but mainly based on the time of their last un-
choke. According to the official client’s version notes, this
new choking algorithm in seed state aims at reducing the
amount of duplicate data a seed needs to upload before it
has pushed out a full copy of the content into the torrent.
Some other clients have implemented a super-seeding
feature with similar goals, in particular to assist a service
provider with limited upload capacity in seeding a large tor-
rent. A seed in super-seeding mode masquerades as a nor-
mal leecher with no data. As other peers connect to it, it will
advertise a piece that it has never uploaded or that is very
rare. After uploading this piece to a leecher, the seed will
not advertise any new pieces to that leecher until it sees an-
other peer’s advertisement for the piece, indicating that the
leecher has indeed shared the piece with others. This algo-
rithm has anecdotally resulted in much higher seeding ef-
ficiencies by reducing the amount of redundant pieces up-
loaded by the seed, and limiting the amount of data sent to
peers who do not contribute [2]. A single seed running in
this mode is supposed to be able to upload a full copy of the
entire content after only uploading 105% of the content data
volume. Since the official client has not implemented this
super-seeding feature, our experiments do not measure its ef-
fect on the efficiency of the initial seed. Instead, we measure
the number of duplicate pieces uploaded by the initial seed
when employing the new choking algorithm in seed state.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Experimental Setup
All our experiments were performed with private torrents on
the PlanetLab experimental platform [5]. PlanetLab’s conve-
nient tools for collecting measurements from geographically
dispersed clients greatly facilitated our work. For instance, in
order to deploy and launch BitTorrent clients on the Planet-
Lab nodes, we utilize the pssh tools [4]. PlanetLab nodes are
typically not behind NATs, and they keep all their ports open,
so each peer in our experiments can be uniquely identified by
its IP address. We consciously chose to experiment on private
torrents in order to examine both per-peer decisions and the
resulting overall torrent behavior. Private torrents allowed us
to observe and record the behavior of all peers throughout
the torrent’s lifetime. It also let us vary experimental param-
eters, such as upload bandwidth limits of the leechers and the
seed. This in turn helped us identify conditions that improve
or hinder overall performance and distinguish which factors
are responsible for observed behavior.
We performed experiments on different torrent configura-
tions, and repeated each experiment run several times. Dur-
ing each experiment, leechers download a single 113 MB file
that consists of 453 pieces, 256 kB each.
PlanetLab’s available bandwidth is unusually high for typ-
ical torrents; we enforce upload limits on the leechers and
seed to model realistic scenarios. However, we do not im-
pose any download limits whatsoever, nor do we attempt to
match our upload limits to inherent limitations of PlanetLab
nodes. Thus, for example, we might end up imposing a high
upload limit on a node that cannot possibly send data that
fast, due to network or other problems.
We perform our experiments with a single initial seed, and
in all experiments, all leechers join at the same time, simulat-
ing a flash crowd scenario. Although the behavior of a torrent
might be different with other peer arrival patterns, we are in-
terested in examining peer behavior under circumstances of
high load. The initial seed stays connected to the torrent for
the duration of each experiment, while leechers disconnect
from the torrent immediately after completing their down-
load.
We collect our measurements by utilizing a modified ver-
sion of the official BitTorrent implementation [1], which we
instrumented to record interesting events and peer interac-
tions. The instrumented client is based on version 4.0.2 of the
official client, which was released in May 2005. Our client
is publicly available for download [3]. The instrumentation
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we collect consists of a log of each message sent or received
along with the content of the message, a log of each state
change, the rate estimates used by the choking algorithm,
and a log of other information, such as internal states of the
choking algorithm.
3.2 Torrent Configurations
We experimented with several torrent configurations. The
parameters we changed from configuration to configuration
are the upload limits for the seed and leechers, and the up-
load bandwidth distribution of leechers. As mentioned be-
fore, leecher download bandwidth is never artificially lim-
ited, although in some cases, local network characteristics
may impose an effective upload or download limit. Since any
leecher could potentially download as fast as any other, dif-
ferences in observed download rates originate solely in Bit-
Torrent’s choking algorithm.
We ran experiments with the following configurations:
• Two-class: leechers are divided into two categories with
different imposed upload limits. This configuration en-
ables us to observe system behavior in highly bipolar
scenarios. Our experiments involve similar numbers of
slow peers, with 20 kB/s upload limit, and fast peers,
with 200 kB/s upload limit.
• Three-class: leechers are divided into three categories
with different imposed upload limits. This configuration
helps us in identifying the qualitative behavioral differ-
ences of more distinct classes of peers. Our experiments
involve similar numbers of slow peers, with 20 kB/s up-
load limit; medium peers, with 50 kB/s upload limit; and
fast peers, with 200 kB/s upload limit.
• Uniform: upload limits are imposed on leechers accord-
ing to a uniform distribution, with a small 5 kB/s step.
In our experiments the slowest leecher has an upload
limit of 20 kB/s, the second slowest a limit of 25 kB/s,
and so on. This configuration provides insight into the
behavior of more homogeneous torrents.
Our graphs in the next section correspond to experiments
run with the three-class configuration, but the conclusions
we draw accord well with the results of other experiments as
well. We stress distinctions where appropriate.
In our experiments, we have considered both a well-
provisioned and an underprovisioned initial seed. Seed up-
load capacity has already been shown to be critical to perfor-
mance at the beginning of a torrent’s lifetime, before the seed
has uploaded a complete copy of the content [6, 15]. How-
ever, it is not clear what the impact of an initial seed with
limited capacity is on system properties. Moreover, the ca-
pacity threshold below which a limited initial seed adversely
impacts the system performance is not trivial to discover.
The correct provisioning of the initial seed is fundamental
for content providers, in order for them to support torrents
that support high system capacity. We attempt to sketch a
possible answer in Section 5.1 based on our experimental re-
sults.
We also ran preliminary experiments where the initial seed
disconnects after uploading an entire copy of the content, but
leechers remain connected after they complete their down-
load, becoming seeds for a short period. Peers in these ex-
periments have somewhat lower completion times than con-
figurations with a single seed and immediate leecher discon-
nection, but appear otherwise similar.
All our experiments are performed with collaborative
peers, i.e., peers that never change their upload capacity dur-
ing a download, or disconnect before receiving a complete
copy of the content. However, by considering different up-
load capacities, and observing the resulting impact on the
download rates of peers, we can obtain an initial understand-
ing of BitTorrent system properties in the presence of selfish
peers, i.e., peers that want to maximize their utility in the
system by abusing protocol mechanisms.
3.3 Experiment Rationale
The goal of our experiments is to understand the dynam-
ics and evaluate the efficiency of the choking algorithm. To
reach this goal, we consider in this work four metrics.
Clustering: The choking algorithm aims to encourage high
peer reciprocation by favoring peers who contribute.
Therefore, we expect that peers will more frequently
unchoke other peers with similar upload speeds, since
those are the peers that can reciprocate with high
enough rates. This hypothesis has also been formulated
by Qiu et al. [20] in their analytical model of BitTorrent.
Consequently, we expect the choking algorithm to con-
verge toward good clustering shortly after the beginning
of the download, by grouping together peers with sim-
ilar upload capacity. This property, however, has never
been experimentally verified, and it is not clear whether
it is always true. Indeed, let’s consider a simple exam-
ple. Peer A unchokes peer B, because B has been up-
loading data at a high rate to A. Yet, in order for peer
B to continue uploading to peer A, A should also start
sending data to B at a high rate. The only way to initi-
ate such a reciprocative relationship is via an optimistic
unchoke. Since optimistic unchokes are performed at
random, it is not clear whether A and B will ever get a
chance to interact. Therefore, in order to preserve clus-
tering, optimistic unchokes should successfully initiate
interactions between peers with similar upload speeds.
In addition, such interactions should persist, despite po-
tential disruptions, such as optimistic unchokes by oth-
ers or network bandwidth fluctuations.
Sharing incentives: A major goal of the choking algorithm
is to give peers incentives to share data. The algorithm
strives to prevent free-riders from monopolizing the tor-
rent upload capacity, and motivates all peers to con-
tribute, since doing so will improve their own down-
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load rates. Thus, we evaluate the effectiveness of Bit-
Torrent’s sharing incentives by measuring how peers’
upload contributions affect their download completion
time. We expect that the more a peer contributes, the
sooner it will complete its download. We do not expect
to observe strict data volume fairness, where all peers
contribute the same amount of data; peers who upload
at high rates may end up contributing much more data
than others. However, they should be rewarded by com-
pleting their download sooner.
Upload utilization: Upload utilization constitutes a reliable
metric of efficiency in peer-to-peer content distribution
systems, since the total upload capacity of all peers
represents the maximum throughput the system can
achieve as a whole. As a result, a peer-to-peer content
distribution protocol should aim at maximizing peers’
upload utilization. We expect to see this high utilization
in BitTorrent systems in our experiments. The question
is how far BitTorrent is from optimal upload utilization
levels, and which factors can adversely affect utilization
in specific scenarios.
Seed service: The new choking algorithm in seed state takes
into account the waiting time of peers, in addition to
their observed download rates from the seed. Thus, it
should be impossible for leechers to monopolize the ini-
tial seed, regardless of how fast they can download data.
We expect to see an even sharing of the seed upload
bandwidth among all peers.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We now report the results of representative experiments that
demonstrate our main observations. For conciseness, we
present only results drawn from the three-class torrent con-
figuration, but our conclusions are consistent with our obser-
vations from other configurations.
4.1 Well-Provisioned Initial Seed
We first examine a scenario with a well-provisioned initial
seed, i.e., a seed that can sustain high upload rates. We expect
this to be common for commercial torrents, whose service
providers typically make sure there is adequate bandwidth
to initially seed the torrent. An example might be Red Hat
distributing its latest Linux distribution. Section 4.2 shows
that peer behavior in the presence of an underprovisioned
initial seed can differ substantially.
We consider an experiment with a single seed and 40
leechers: 13 slow peers (20 kB/s upload limit), 14 medium
peers (50 kB/s upload limit), and 13 fast peers (200 kB/s up-
load limit). The seed, which is represented as peer 41 in the
following figures, is limited to upload 200 kB/s, as fast as
a fast peer. These different peer upload limits are imposed
in order to model different levels of contribution. The re-
sults we report are based on 13 experimental runs. Although
the vanilla official BitTorrent implementation would set the
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Figure 1: Time duration that peers unchoked each other via a regular un-
choke, averaged over all runs. Darker squares represent longer unchoke
times. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50
kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed
(peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. The creation of clusters is clearly visible.
number of parallel uploads based on the imposed upload
limit (4 for the slow, 5 for the medium, and 10 for the fast
peers and the seed), we set this number to 4 for all peers. This
ensures homogeneous conditions in the torrent and makes it
easier to interpret the results.
4.1.1 Clustering
As explained in Section 3.3, we expect to observe cluster-
ing based on peers’ upload capacities. Figure 1 demonstrates
that peers indeed form clusters. The figure plots the total time
peers unchoked each other via a regular unchoke, averaged
over all runs of the experiment. It is clear that peers in the
same class cluster together, in the sense that they prefer to
upload to each other. This behavior becomes more apparent
when considering a metric such as the clustering index. We
define this for a given peer in a given class (fast, medium,
or slow) as the ratio of the duration of regular unchokes to
the peers of its class over the duration of regular unchokes to
all peers. A high clustering index indicates a strong prefer-
ence to upload to peers in the same class. Figure 2 demon-
strates that peers in all classes prefer to unchoke other peers
in their own class, thereby forming clusters. Further exper-
iments with upload limits following a uniform distribution
also show that peers have a clear preference for peers with
similar bandwidths.
Although from Figure 1 it might seem that slow peers
show a proportionally stronger preference for their own
class, this is an artifact of the experiment. Slow peers take
longer to complete their download (as shown in Figure 3),
and so perform a higher number of regular unchokes on aver-
age than fast peers. Also notice that medium peer 27 interacts
frequently with slow peers. This peer’s download capacity is
inherently limited, as seen in Figure 4 that plots observed
peer download speeds over time. As a result, peer 27 stays
connected even after all other peers of its class have com-
pleted their download. During that last period it has to inter-
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Figure 2: Clustering indices for all peers and all runs, in the presence of
a well-provisioned seed. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers
14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s
upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peers show a strong
preference to unchoke other peers in the same class.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the download completion time for the
three different classes of leechers, in the presence of a well-provisioned seed
(limited to 200 kB/s), for all runs. The vertical line represents the earliest
possible time that the download could complete. Fast peers finish much ear-
lier than slow ones.
act with slow leechers, since those are the only ones left. The
preference of peer 27 for slow leechers is also evident from
the spike anomaly in Figure 2.
Figure 1 also shows that reciprocation is not necessarily
mutual. Slow peers frequently unchoke medium peers, but
the favor is not returned. Indeed, the slow peers unchoked the
medium peers for 501,844 seconds, as shown by the center-
left partition that is relatively dark. However, the medium
peers unchoked the slow peers for only 273,985 seconds, as
shown by the bottom-center partition that is lighter. This lack
of reciprocation is due to the fact that slow peers are of little
use to medium peers, since they cannot sustain high upload
rates.
In summary, the choking algorithm eventually reaches
an equilibrium where peers mostly interact with others in
the same class, with the occasional exception of optimistic
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Figure 4: Peer download speeds for all 60-sec time intervals during
the download, averaged over all runs. Darker rectangles represent higher
speeds. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a
50 kB/s upload limit, while peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit.
The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peer 27 achieves lower download
rates than the other peers in its class.
unchokes, which are performed randomly. This clustering
should help keep the incentives mechanism effective.
4.1.2 Sharing Incentives
We now examine whether BitTorrent’s choking algorithm
provides sharing incentives, in the sense that a peer who con-
tributes more to the torrent is rewarded by completing its
download sooner than the rest. Figure 3 demonstrates this
to be the case. We plot the cumulative distribution of com-
pletion time for the three classes of leechers in the previ-
ous experiment. The vertical line in the figure represents the
optimal completion time, the earliest possible time that the
download could complete. This is the time that the seed has
uploaded a complete copy of the content. For this setup, this
time is around 650 seconds into the experiment.
Fast leechers complete their download soon after the opti-
mal completion time. Medium and, especially, slow leechers
take significantly longer to finish. Thus, contributing to the
torrent enables a leecher to enter the fast cluster and receive
data at higher rates. This in turn ensures a short download
completion time. The choking algorithm does indeed fos-
ter reciprocation by rewarding contributing peers. In exper-
iments with upload limits following a uniform distribution,
the peer completion time is also uniform; completion time
decreases when a peer’s upload contribution increases. This
further indicates the algorithm’s consistent properties with
respect to maintaining sharing incentives.
Note, however, that this does not imply any notion of data
volume fairness. Fast peers end up uploading significantly
more data than the rest. Figure 5, which plots the actual vol-
ume of uploaded data averaged over all runs, demonstrates
that fast peers are major contributors to the torrent. Most
of their bandwidth is expended on other fast peers, per the
clustering principle. Interestingly, the slow leechers end up
downloading more data from the seed. The seed provides
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Figure 5: Total number of bytes peers uploaded to each other, averaged over
all runs. Darker squares represent more data. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s
upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40
have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Fast
peers upload much more data than the rest.
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of peers’ upload utilization for all 60-sec time intervals
during the download, in the presence of a well-provisioned seed (limited
to 200 kB/s). Each dot represents the average upload utilization over all
peers for a given experiment run. Utilization is kept high during most of the
download session.
equal service to peers of any class; however, slow peers have
more opportunity to download from the seed since they take
longer to complete.
In summary, BitTorrent provides effective incentives for
peers to contribute, as doing so will reward a leecher with
significantly higher download rates. Recent studies [16, 17]
have shown that limited free-riding is possible in BitTor-
rent under specific circumstances, although such free-riders
do not appear to severely impact the quality of service for
other peers. However, these studies do not significantly chal-
lenge the effectiveness of sharing incentives enforced by the
choking algorithm. Although free-riding is indeed possible,
the selfish peers typically achieve lower download rates than
they would if they followed the protocol. As a result, if peers
wish to obtain as high download rates as possible, it is still
in their best interest to conform to protocol guidelines.
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Figure 7: Duration of all unchokes (regular and optimistic) performed by
the seed to each peer. Results for a single representative run. Peers 1 to 13
have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and
peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to
200 kB/s. The seed provides uniform service to all leechers.
4.1.3 Upload Utilization
We now turn our attention to performance by measuring
whether the choking algorithm can maintain high utilization
of the peers’ upload capacity. Upload utilization constitutes
a reliable metric of efficiency in content distribution systems
since the total upload capacity of all peers represents the
maximum throughput the system can achieve as a whole. As
a result, an efficient protocol should keep peers’ upload pipes
full at all times.
Figure 6 is a scatterplot of peers’ upload utilization in the
aforementioned setup. A utilization of 1 represents taking
full advantage of the available upload capacity. Utilization
for each of the 13 runs is plotted once per minute. The met-
ric is torrent-wide: for each minute, we sum the upload band-
width used by the peers during that minute, and divide by the
upload capacity available over that minute from all peers still
connected at the minute’s end. The total capacity decreases
over time as peers complete their downloads and disconnect.
Utilization is low at the beginning and the end of the ses-
sion, but close to optimal for the majority of the download.
It increases slightly after approximately 900 seconds, which
corresponds to when fast peers leave the torrent; perhaps the
4-peer limit on parallel uploads restricts fast peers’ utiliza-
tion, or perhaps TCP congestion control’s AIMD dynamics
have more impact at higher bandwidths. Nevertheless, uti-
lization is good overall.
In summary, the choking algorithm, in cooperation with
other BitTorrent mechanisms such as rarest-first piece selec-
tion, does a good job of ensuring high utilization of the up-
load capacity of leechers during most of the download. We
discuss a potential solution to low upload utilization at the
beginning of a leecher’s download in Section 5.2.
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Figure 8: Number of pieces uploaded by the seed, for a single representative
run. The Unique line represents the pieces that had not been previously up-
loaded, while the Total line represents the total number of pieces uploaded
so far. The seed is limited to 200 kB/s. We observe a 16% duplicate piece
overhead.
4.1.4 Seed Service
The official BitTorrent client’s choking algorithm for seeds
changed as of version 4.0.0, as described in Section 2.3.
The client’s version notes claim that this new algorithm “ad-
dresses the problem for which super-seeding was created, but
without its problems”. We performed detailed experiments to
study this new algorithm for the first time, and examine this
claim.
Figure 7 shows the duration of unchokes, both regular and
optimistic, performed by the seed in a representative run of
the aforementioned setup. Leechers are unchoked in a uni-
form manner, regardless of upload speed. Fast peers, those
with higher peer IDs, complete their download sooner, af-
ter which time the seed divides its upload bandwidth among
the remaining leechers. Leecher 8 is the last to complete (as
shown in Figure 4), and receives exclusive service from the
seed during the end of its download. We see that the new
choking algorithm in seed state provides uniform service;
this is because it takes each leecher’s waiting time into ac-
count. As a result, the risk of fast leechers downloading the
entire content and quickly disconnecting from the torrent
is reduced. Furthermore, this behavior might help mitigate
the effectiveness of exploits that attempt to monopolize the
seeds [16].
According to anecdotal evidence [2], seeds using the pre-
4.0.0 choking algorithm might have to upload 150% to 200%
of the total content size before other peers became seeds.
In our experiments, the new choking algorithm avoids this
problem. Figure 8 plots the number of pieces uploaded by
the seed during the download session for a representative
run. 527 pieces are sent out before an entire copy of the
content (453 pieces) has been uploaded. Thus, the duplicate
piece overhead is around 16%, indicating that the new chok-
ing algorithm in seed state avoids unnecessarily uploading
duplicate pieces to a certain extent. This number was consis-
tent across all our experiments. However, to the best of our
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Figure 9: Time duration that peers unchoked each other via a regular un-
choke, averaged over all runs. Darker squares represent longer unchoke
times. Peers 1 to 12 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 13 to 26 have a
50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The
seed (peer 27) is limited to 100 kB/s. There is no discernible clustering.
knowledge, there has been no experimental evaluation of the
corresponding overhead in the old choking algorithm in seed
state, so it is not clear how much of an improvement this is;
we will investigate this in future work.
Nevertheless, 16% duplication represents an opportunity
for improvement. The existing implementation always issues
requests for pieces in the rarest pieces set in the same or-
der, if the set contains more than one. As a result, leechers
might end up requesting the same rarest piece from the seed
at approximately the same time. It would arguably be prefer-
able for leechers to request rarest pieces in random order, so
that the probability of multiple leechers requesting the same
piece at the same time is minimized.
In summary, the new choking algorithm in seed state uni-
formly distributes seed upload capacity among leechers, in-
dependently of their upload contributions. Our results also
show that it incurs a reasonably low duplicate piece over-
head.
4.2 Underprovisioned Initial Seed
We now turn our attention to a scenario with an underpro-
visioned initial seed and demonstrate that the seed upload
capacity is critical to performance during the beginning of a
torrent’s lifetime. The experiment we present here involves
a single seed and 39 leechers, 12 slow, 14 medium, and 12
fast. The initial seed in this case, represented as peer 27 in
the following figures, is limited to 100 kB/s, not 200 kB/s.
We set the number of parallel uploads again to 4 for the seed
and all the leechers. The results we present are based on 8 ex-
periment runs, and are consistent with our observations for
experiments with other torrent configurations. We show that
peer behavior in the presence of an underprovisioned initial
seed is substantially different than with a well-provisioned
initial seed.
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Figure 10: Clustering indices for all peers in the presence of an underprovi-
sioned seed. Peers 1 to 12 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 13 to 26 have a
50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The
seed (peer 27) is limited to 100 kB/s. Peers do not show a clear preference
to unchoke other peers in any particular class.
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Figure 11: Normalized interested time duration for each peer pair, averaged
over all runs. Darker squares represent higher peer availability. Peers 1 to 12
have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 13 to 26 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and
peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer 27) is limited to
100 kB/s. Fast peers have poor peer availability to all other peers.
4.2.1 Clustering
Figure 9 shows the total time peers unchoked each other via a
regular unchoke, averaged over all runs of the experiment. In
contrast to Figure 1, there is no discernible clustering among
peers in the same class. The lack of clustering in the presence
of an underprovisioned initial seed becomes more apparent
when considering the clustering index metric mentioned in
Section 4.1.1. Figure 10 shows the clustering indices of all
peers. They are all very similar, indicating a lack of prefer-
ence to unchoke peers in any particular class. Compare this
to Figure 2, where the preference for peers in the same class
is evident.
Figure 11 explains this behavior by plotting the peer avail-
ability of each peer to each other peer, averaged over all runs
of the experiment. We define the peer availability of a down-
loading peer Y to an uploading peer X as the ratio of the time
X was interested in Y to the time that Y spent in the peer set
of X . A peer availability of 1 means that the uploading peer
was always interested in the downloading peer, while a peer
availability of 0 means that the uploading peer was never in-
terested in the downloading peer.
From the figure we can see that the fast peers have poor
peer availability to all other peers. The seed is uploading new
pieces at a low rate, so even if the seed uploaded only to fast
peers, those fast peers would quickly replicate every piece
as it was completed, remaining idle for the rest of the time.
Thus, fast peers are not interested in others most of the time.
The same is not true for slow peers, since they upload even
more slowly than the seed. In addition, when a fast leecher is
unchoked by a slow leecher, it will always reciprocate with
high rates, and thereby be preferred by the slow leecher. As
a result, fast peers will get new pieces even from medium
and slow peers. Thus, fast peers prevent clustering by tak-
ing up slower peers’ unchoke slots and thus breaking any
clusters that might be starting to form. Further experiments
with other torrent configurations, including one with the ini-
tial seed further limited to 20 kB/s, confirm this conclusion.
In summary, when the initial seed is underprovisioned, the
choking algorithm does not enable peer clustering. We study
in the next section how this lack of clustering affects the ef-
fectiveness of sharing incentives.
4.2.2 Sharing Incentives
Given the lack of clustering, we now examine whether Bit-
Torrent’s choking algorithm still provides incentives to share
even in the presence of an underprovisioned initial seed. In
particular, we examine whether fast peers still complete their
download sooner than others. Figure 12 shows that this is
no longer the case. Most peers complete their download at
approximately the same time. Most points in the tail of the
figure are due to a single slow peer, peer 8, which in every
run completed its download last. This PlanetLab node has a
poor effective download speed independently of the choking
algorithm, likely due to network problems or machine over-
load. All other peers achieve completion times below 2000
seconds in every experiment. Clearly, seed upload capacity is
the performance bottleneck. Once the seed finishes upload-
ing a full copy of the content, all peers complete soon there-
after. Since uploading data to other peers does not shorten
a peer’s completion time, BitTorrent’s sharing incentives are
ineffective here.
Fast peers are again the major contributors in the torrent,
but in this case their upload bandwidth is expended equally
across other fast peers and slower peers alike. Figure 13 plots
the amount of uploaded data between each peer pair. A quick
visual inspection shows that the fast peers contribute roughly
equally to all other peers, and that fast peers made most con-
tributions, while the slow ones made the least.
In summary, when the initial seed is underprovisioned, the
choking algorithm does not provide effective incentives to
10
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 60000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Completion Time (s)
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 P
ee
rs
Download Completion Time (All Runs)
 
 
fast
medium
slow
Figure 12: Cumulative distribution of the download completion time for the
three different classes of leechers, in the presence of an underprovisioned
seed (limited to 100 kB/s), for all runs. The vertical line represents the ear-
liest possible time that the download could complete. Most peers complete
at approximately the same time, soon after the seed finishes uploading a full
copy of the content.
0 10 20 30 400
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40  
Uploading peer ID
Aggregate Amount of Uploaded Data (All Runs)
 
D
ow
nl
oa
di
ng
 p
ee
r I
D
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 107
Figure 13: Total number of bytes peers uploaded to each other, averaged
over all runs. Darker squares represent more data. Peers 1 to 12 have a 20
kB/s upload limit, peers 13 to 26 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers
28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer 27) is limited to 100
kB/s. Fast peers upload much more data than the rest, distributing those
data evenly among all peers.
share. However, the available upload capacity of fast peers
is effectively utilized to efficiently replicate the pieces being
sent by the initial seed.
4.2.3 Upload Utilization
We now evaluate the impact of an underprovisioned initial
seed on overall BitTorrent system performance. Figure 14
plots peers’ upload utilization. Even with a slow seed, upload
utilization remains relatively high. Leechers manage to ex-
change data productively among themselves once new pieces
are downloaded from the slow seed, so that the lack of clus-
tering does not degrade torrent performance significantly. In-
terestingly, the BitTorrent design seems to lead the system to
do the right thing: fast peers contribute their bandwidth to re-
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Figure 14: Scatterplot of peers’ upload utilization for all 60-sec time in-
tervals during the download, in the presence of an underprovisioned seed
(limited to 100 kB/s). Each dot represents the average upload utilization
over all peers for a given experiment run. Utilization is kept at acceptable
levels despite the seed limitation.
0 20 40 60 80 1000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Time slot (60s)
Up
lo
ad
 u
tili
za
tio
n
Global Upload Utilization (All Runs)
Figure 15: Scatterplot of peers’ upload utilization for all 60-sec time inter-
vals during the download, in the presence of a severely underprovisioned
seed (limited to 20 kB/s). Each dot represents the average upload utilization
over all peers for a given experiment run. Utilization is poor when the seed
is very slow.
duce the burden on the initial seed, helping disseminate the
available pieces to slower peers. Indeed, this destroys clus-
tering, but it improves the torrent efficiency, which is a rea-
sonable decision given the situation.
We also experimented with a seed limited to an upload
capacity of 20 kB/s. With this extremely low seed upload
speed, there are few new pieces available to exchange at any
point in time, and each new piece gets disseminated rapidly
after it is retrieved from the seed. Fig. 15 shows that the over-
all upload utilization is now low; slow peers exhibit slightly
higher utilization than the rest, since they do not need many
available pieces to use up their available upload capacity.
In summary, even in situations where the initial seed is
underprovisioned, the global upload utilization can be high.
However, our experiments only involve collaborative users,
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who do not try to adapt their upload speed according to
a utility function of the observed download speed. On the
other hand, in a selfish environment with an underprovi-
sioned seed, one might expect a lower upload utilization due
to the lack of sharing incentives.
5 DISCUSSION
We discuss two limitations of the choking algorithm that we
identified in the section 4: seed upload capacity is fundamen-
tal to the proper operation of the incentives mechanism, and
at the beginning of the download session peers take some
time to reach full upload utilization.
5.1 Seed Provisioning
When the initial seed is underprovisioned, the choking al-
gorithm does not lead to clustering of similar-bandwidth
peers. Even without clustering, however, we observed high
upload utilization. Interestingly, in the presence of a slow
initial seed, the protocol makes fast leechers contribute to
the download of all other peers, fast or slow, as evidenced in
Figure 13, thereby improving the overall torrent capacity.
However, whenever feasible, one should engineer ade-
quate initial seed capacity in order to allow fast leechers to
achieve high performance. Our results show that the lack of
clustering occurs when fast peers cannot maintain their inter-
est in other fast peers. In order to avoid this situation, the ini-
tial seed should at least be able to upload data at a speed that
matches that of the fastest peers in the torrent. This sugges-
tion is simply a rule-of-thumb guideline, and assumes that
the service provider knows a priori the maximum upload ca-
pacity of the peers that may join the torrent in the future.
In practice, reasonable bounds could be derived from mea-
surements or from an analysis of deployed network technolo-
gies. Further research is needed to evaluate the exact impact
of seed capacity. We are currently developing an analytical
model that attempts to express the effect of initial seed ca-
pacity on the overall torrent performance.
5.2 Tracker Protocol Extension
When a new leecher first joins the torrent, it connects to a
random subset of already-connected peers that are returned
by the tracker. However, in order to reach its optimal band-
width utilization, this new peer needs to exchange data with
those peers that have a similar upload capacity to itself. If
there are few such peers in the torrent, it may take some time
to discover them, since this process has to be done via ran-
dom optimistic unchokes that take place only once every 30
seconds.
Consequently, it might be preferable in such a scenario to
employ the tracker to assist in matching similar-bandwidth
leechers. In this manner, the discovery period duration could
decrease and the upload utilization would be high even at the
beginning of a peer’s download. The new peer could report
its upload capacity to the tracker when joining the torrent.
This speed can be the one configured in the client software,
or possibly the actual maximum upload speed measured dur-
ing previous downloads. The tracker would then reply with
a random subset of peers as usual, along with their upload
capacity. The new leecher would have the option of perform-
ing optimistic unchokes first to peers with upload capacity
similar to its own, in an effort to discover the best partners
sooner.
With this new tracker protocol extension, if the peer set
contains only a few leechers with similar upload capacity,
they will be discovered quickly. However, since the tracker
still returns a random subset of peers independently of the
advertised upload capacity, there is no benefit for a peer to
lie. If it does so, other peers who connect to it will discover
this fact quickly, and choke the lying leecher, since it would
not be able to sustain appropriate upload rates. In a collab-
orative environment, however, the tracker might even want
to return peers based on their advertised upload capacity, as
also proposed in [6], in order to speed up cluster creation
even more. Although this extension is promising, further re-
search is required to verify that it will work as expected.
6 RELATED WORK
There has been a fair amount of work on the performance and
behavior of BitTorrent systems. Bram Cohen, the protocol’s
creator, has described BitTorrent’s main mechanisms and
their design rationales [8]. Several analytical studies have
formulated models for BitTorrent-like protocols. Biersack et
al. [7] propose an analysis of three content distribution mod-
els: a linear chain, a tree, and a forest of trees. They discuss
the impact of the number of pieces and the number of parallel
uploads for each model, and claim that the optimal efficiency
is achieved using 3 to 5 parallel uploads. Yang et al. [23]
study the service capacity of BitTorrent systems and show
that it increases exponentially at the beginning of the torrent,
and scales well with the number of peers. Qiu et al. [20] ex-
tend this work by providing an analytical solution to a fluid
model of BitTorrent. Their results show BitTorrent’s high up-
load utilization. However, their model assumes peer selec-
tion based on global knowledge of all peers in the torrent,
as well as uniform distribution of pieces. Moreover, they do
not consider the dynamics of the choking algorithm. Mas-
soulie et al. [18] introduce a probabilistic model and claim
that system performance does not depend critically on the
rarest-first piece selection strategy. Lastly, Fan et al. [9] char-
acterize the complete design space of BitTorrent-like pro-
tocols by providing a mathematical model that captures the
trade-off between high performance and fairness. As previ-
ously mentioned, whereas all these models provide valuable
insight into the behavior of BitTorrent systems, unrealistic
assumptions limit their applicability in real scenarios.
Other researchers have relied on simulations to understand
BitTorrent’s properties. Felber et al. [10] compare different
peer and piece selection strategies in different torrent config-
urations. Bharambe et al. [6] utilize a discrete event simula-
tor to evaluate upload utilization and bit-level fairness. They
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find that the protocol scales very well and that the rarest-first
algorithm outperforms alternative piece selection strategies.
However, they do not evaluate a peer set larger than 15 peers,
whereas the official implementation has a default value of
80. This limitation may have an important impact on the be-
havior of the protocol, as the accuracy of the piece selec-
tion strategy is affected by the peer set size. Moreover, they
do not consider the new version of the choking algorithm in
seed state. Tian et al. [22] propose a simple analytical model
to study BitTorrent’s performance and validate it using simu-
lations. They also propose and evaluate a new peer selection
strategy during the last phase of a download session, in order
to enable more peers to complete their download after the
departure of all the seeds.
There have been several measurement studies that exam-
ined actual BitTorrent traffic. Izal et al. [12] identify sev-
eral peer characteristics in the tracker log for the Redhat
Linux 9 ISO image, including the percentage of peers com-
pleting the download, load on the seeds, and geographical
spread of participating peers. They observe a correlation be-
tween uploaded and downloaded amount of data. Pouwelse
et al. [19] study the file popularity, file availability, down-
load performance, and content lifetime on a formerly popu-
lar tracker website. They observe that, although BitTorrent
can efficiently handle large flash crowds, the central tracker
component could potentially be a bottleneck. A more recent
study by Guo et al. [11] demonstrates that peer performance
fluctuates widely in small torrents, and that high-bandwidth
peers tend to contribute less to the torrents. Inter-torrent col-
laboration is proposed as an alternative to providing extra
incentives for leechers to stay connected after the comple-
tion of their download. Lastly, Legout et al. [15] run exten-
sive experiments on real torrents, from the viewpoint of a
single peer. They show that the rarest-first and choking al-
gorithms play a critical role in BitTorrent’s performance. In
particular, they show that the rarest-first piece selection strat-
egy approximates an optimal piece selection strategy after a
complete copy of the content has been uploaded, and that the
choking algorithm fosters reciprocation. They claim that the
replacement of the current choking algorithm by a bit-level
tit-for-tat algorithm is not appropriate, as proposed by other
researchers [13]. However, they do not identify the reasons
behind the properties of the choking algorithm, and fail to
examine its dynamics due to the single peer viewpoint.
Furthermore, researchers have looked into the feasibility
of circumventing BitTorrent mechanisms to free-ride on the
torrent. Shneidman et al. [21] were the first to demonstrate
that BitTorrent exploits are indeed feasible. Jun et al. [13]
argue that the choking algorithm cannot prevent free-riding,
and propose a new algorithm as a replacement. Liogkas et
al. [16] design and implement three exploits that allow a peer
that does not contribute to maintain high download rates un-
der specific circumstances. However, they show that, even
though such peers can sometimes obtain more bandwidth,
there is no considerable degradation of the overall system’s
quality of service. Lastly, Locher et al. [17] extend this work
by demonstrating that limited free-riding is feasible even in
the absence of seeds. They also describe how free-riding is
possible in BitTorrent sharing communities.
Our work differs from all previous studies in its approach
and results. We perform the first extensive experimental
study of BitTorrent in a controlled environment, by monitor-
ing all the peers in the torrent, and examining the behavior
of the BitTorrent system in a variety of scenarios. Our results
validate protocol properties that have not been demonstrated
experimentally previously, as well as new properties with re-
spect to the impact of the initial seed on performance.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented the first experimental investiga-
tion of BitTorrent systems that links per-peer decisions and
overall torrent behavior. Our results validated three BitTor-
rent properties that, though widely believed to hold, have
not been demonstrated experimentally. We showed that the
choking algorithm enables clustering of similar-bandwidth
peers, ensures effective sharing incentives by rewarding
peers who contribute with high download rates, and achieves
high upload utilization for the majority of the download du-
ration. We also examined the properties of the new choking
algorithm in seed state and the impact of initial seed capac-
ity on the overall BitTorrent system performance. In particu-
lar, we showed that an underprovisioned initial seed does not
enable clustering of peers and does not guarantee effective
sharing incentives. However, we showed that even in such a
case, the choking algorithm guarantees an efficient utiliza-
tion of the available resources by enforcing fast peers to help
other peers with their download. Based on our observations,
we offered guidelines for content providers regarding seed
provisioning, and discussed a tracker protocol extension that
addresses an identified limitation of the protocol.
This work opens up many avenues for future work. We
are currently developing an analytical model to express the
effect of the seed capacity on torrent performance. It would
also be interesting to run experiments with the old choking
algorithm in seed state and compare its properties to the new
algorithm. In addition, we would like to investigate the im-
pact of different number of regular and optimistic unchokes
on the protocol’s performance and fairness properties. It has
recently been argued [9] that the trade-off between these two
kind of unchokes is critical. The current values used by the
protocol are intuition-based engineering choices; we would
like to conduct a systematic evaluation of system behavior
under different values for these parameters.
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